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Abstract
Background: Special services within public hospitals are becoming increasingly common in low and middle
income countries with the stated objective of providing higher comfort services to affluent customers and
generating resources for under funded hospitals. In the present study expenditures, outputs and costs are analysed
for the Maputo Central Hospital and its Special Clinic with the objective of identifying net resource flows between
a system operating two-tier charging, and, ultimately, understanding whether public hospitals can somehow
benefit from running Special Clinic operations.
Methods: A combination of step-down and bottom-up costing strategies were used to calculate recurrent as well
as capital expenses, apportion them to identified cost centres and link costs to selected output measures.
Results: The results show that cost differences between main hospital and clinic are marked and significant, with
the Special Clinic’s cost per patient and cost per outpatient visit respectively over four times and over thirteen
times their equivalent in the main hospital.
Discussion: While the main hospital cost structure appeared in line with those from similar studies, salary
expenditures were found to drive costs in the Special Clinic (73% of total), where capital and drug costs were
surprisingly low (2 and 4% respectively). We attributed low capital and drug costs to underestimation by our study
owing to difficulties in attributing the use of shared resources and to the Special Clinic’s outsourcing policy. The
large staff expenditure would be explained by higher physician time commitment, economic rents and subsidies
to hospital staff. On the whole it was observed that: (a) the flow of capital and human resources was not fully
captured by the financial systems in place and stayed largely unaccounted for; (b) because of the little
consideration given to capital costs, the main hospital is more likely to be subsidising its Special Clinic operations,
rather than the other way around.
Conclusion: We conclude that the observed lack of transparency may create scope for an inequitable cross
subsidy of private customers by public resources.
Background
’Private’, ‘high-cost’ and ‘special’ c l i n i c sa n dw a r d sa r e
increasingly common features of public hospitals in
Africa and other parts of the world [1,2]. These services
are targeted at middle and upper class groups who are
prepared to pay higher charges for services with higher
levels of amenity (such as hotel services which are not
considered clinically relevant), or in some cases for
choice of doctor [1]. A common rationale for the devel-
opment of such services is that they will generate
resources for under-funded parts of the health system.
For example in some Provinces of South Africa, the pol-
icy is being developed with the objective of generating
resources largely for the primary care system [3]. In
other settings, for example Zambia, resources are
retained at hospital level with the objective of generating
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population [4].
However, the policy is not universally endorsed. It
inevitably creates inequity by creating two-tier service
provision. It may be difficult to maintain a quality
separation between the two services based only on ame-
nity levels, and to ensure comparable clinical quality of
care [1,2]. Equally difficult to establish is the balance of
net resource flows between services. Accounting systems
are seldom set up to enable this. Private clinic and ward
users access services from all over the hospital where
there is no dedicated service. Resources generated
through private services are seldom lodged in a single
profit and loss account and then distributed. Financial
transactions are complex. No study that we know of has
traced resource flows through the full breadth of a hos-
pital operating a two-tier charging strategy with the
objective of identifying net resource flows between the
two services. This was the objective of the study
reported in this paper.
In Mozambique, the existence of dual practice is
recognised with both public sector physicians owning
private clinics and others providing private services
within central, provincial, general and, to some extent
rural hospitals - the so-called “special services” and “spe-
cial clinics” [5]. At the time of the study, Maputo Cen-
tral Hospital (MCH) was the largest hospital in
Mozambique with 1,518 beds and about 2,000 employ-
ees. The creation of the MCH Special Clinic was
authorised in 1977 after independence by the FRELIMO
ruling party and then regulated by the Government
through successive legislation, with the objective of pro-
viding adequate care for party members and interna-
tional diplomatic officials in Maputo [6,7]. According to
the original regulation, selected venues of the MCH
were to be rehabilitated for the purpose, and MCH staff
was to serve in the special clinic outside their regular
shift for extra compensation. Since 1977 the special
clinic has grown to include 4 departments, 36 beds and
employs 71 full time staff, for an annual turnover of
about 1 million USD. The special clinic offers all the
services available in the main hospital, offering patients
the advantages of choice of physicians and time of visit,
booking service, and attendance in separate facilities.
The majority of special clinic activities take place in the
restricted premises assigned to the clinic, with the
exception of surgical operations and laboratory analysis,
for which the special clinic makes use of the main hos-
pital facilities in exchange for direct payments to per-
sonnel and departments involved. Heads of department
and selected medical staff from the main hospital serve
in the special clinic. Nurses and non-medical staff from
the main hospital rotate annually to work a regular shift
in the special clinic. The special clinic pays a monthly
sum of 200 million MZM (about 10,000USD at the time
of the study) to the main hospital as a contribution to
the MCH general expenses.
In MCH, the special clinic sits uncomfortably adja-
cent to the accident and emergency department. This
means that critically ill patients waiting long periods
for services in hot and dusty conditions can view
richer hospital users with more minor conditions
securing fast access to service in comfortable condi-
tions. This makes the two-tier service unpopular and
politically conspicuous. Since the 2005 election the
new FRELIMO government signalled its intention to
abolish the institution of Special Clinics across the
country, and a new minister from the MCH was put in
charge to reform the system under a highly publicised
anticorruption agenda [8]. In 2007, a ban on private
practice within hospital facilities was introduced, to
eliminate special services and special clinics within the
country’s major hospitals, although still allowing pub-
licly employed physicians to practice in private clinics
outside their public hospital hours [9]. With a sudden
change of leadership in 2011, the debate around the
MCH Special Clinic appears to have died out.
To date, a few costing studies [10,11] have been car-
ried out focusing on specific parts of the hospital but
this was the first to cover MCH as a whole and to
include costing of the Special Clinic.
Methods
Data were collected and analysed during 2001, pertain-
ing to the financial year 2000-2001.
Step-down costing
Most cost items were estimated using a step-down cost-
ing method [12]. This method uses data available at
hospital level and disaggregates by direct cost centre
and indirect cost centre. A direct cost centre is a unit
within the hospital that directly produces the output of
interest, for example inpatient or outpatient stays and
visits. An indirect cost centre is a unit, which does so
indirectly, for example by producing diagnostic test
results, which are the constituent components of an out-
patient, stay or visit.
Costs were apportioned using the apportionment cri-
teria described in Table 1, in some cases via an inter-
mediate cost centre. Intermediate cost centres that were
themselves direct consumers of resources were appor-
tioned to final cost centres using the criteria described
in Table 2.
Bottom-up costing
Step-down costing was complemented by selective use
of bottom-up costing for the specific major inputs, staff,
drugs and medical supplies, and capital items [13]. The
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nature and estimated reliability of data at different
points in the hospital and are described for each of the
main cost categories.
Staff costs
Number of staff by grade, department and/or service
unit, permanent or contract was established by visiting
all department heads. Salary mid-points and average or
standard allowance packages were calculated for each
staff grade. These combined to produce estimates of
annual total staff costs for each service unit or depart-
ment as appropriate. At the special clinic, aggregate
annual personnel costs for both permanent and contract
workers were obtained from the financial statement and
from service specific cost records. Discrepancies were
found between the two sources and the aggregate finan-
cial statement was apportioned according to the shares
of staff costs in the service specific cost records.
Drug and medical supplies costs
A centralised and computerised system of drugs distri-
bution and consumption by service units was used at
MCH. Price data were obtained from government ten-
der documents used in drug and medical supply pro-
curement, and from private pharmacies where those
were not available. The hospital pharmacy did collate
patient origin - inpatient or outpatient - data. A review
of dispensing records for the previous 3 weeks was car-
ried out to estimate apportionment factors. Like drugs,
medical supplies are sourced from Central Medical
Stores but there is a specific warehouse that stores and
distributes all types of medical supply (but not surgical
supplies) once received by the hospital. The central
operating theatre stores and distributes surgical supply.
The medical supplies warehouse keeps stock records. A
randomly selected 3-month sample of these was
reviewed in order to apportion medical supplies costs.
For surgical supplies, the central operating theatre keeps
no records but the consumption pattern for six smaller
theatres was established through requisition records
kept in each. Following examples in the literature on
allocating drugs expenditures across hospital cost cen-
tres [14], the unaccounted for receipts by the central
operating theatre were assumed to be consumed directly
there.
For the special clinic, some drugs were obtained from
the main pharmacy and it was attempted to capture this
consumption by the methods described above. In addi-
tion, the special clinic privately procures drugs and
medical supplies. A computerised database includes
Table 1 Cost categories and apportionment methods
Cost category Indirect cost
centre
(where
applicable)
Final
apportionment
Non-salary personnel expenses
Per diems Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Funeral subsidy Total salary cost
Goods
Fuel and lubricants Transport and
logistics
Number of
admissions
Infrastructure maintenance Floor space
Equipment maintenance Equipment value
Perishable stationery Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Uniform and shoes Total staff
numbers
Other perishable goods Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Services
Communications Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Flight tickets Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Facility rent Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Infrastructure maintenance Space
Equipment maintenance Equipment value
Transport and cargo Transport/logistics Admissions
Insurance Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Legal representation Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Consultancy and technical
assistance
Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Water and electricity Floor space
Health information Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Other services Floor space
Current transfers
Customs tax Administration Inpatient
equivalents
Table 2 Apportionment method used for intermediate
cost centres
Intermediate cost centre Apportionment
Central operating theatre Number of operations
Blood Consumption of blood units
Pathology Pathology investigations ordered
Clinical analysis Laboratory tests ordered
Imaging Images requested
Pharmacy Drug consumption
Food provision Patient and staff days
Laundry Patient days
Hygiene and cleaning Floor space
Mortuary Admissions
Transport and logistics Admissions
Administration Inpatient equivalents
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although it is not possible to classify patients by service
unit (inpatient and outpatient) using this database.
Instead, these costs were apportioned using inpatient
equivalents calculated as patient days for the clinics
involving the assumption that patient days are equiva-
lent to attendances divided by the average length of stay
(3.47 days in the special clinic).
Capital costs
Annual capital costs were collected from hospital level
data and apportioned according to an inventory of furni-
ture and movable equipment, valued at replacement
cost. The estimated allocation to each service unit was
annuitised using a discount rate of 5%. Rent values
based on floor space were used to value buildings, many
of which have no book value if a 30-year life is assumed.
Using the allocation of total cost to final cost centres
which in turn had used a combination of step-down and
bottom-up costing methods, unit costs were calculated
on the basis of the activity statistics inpatient days,
admissions and outpatient visits. Costs for intermediate
cost centres’ outputs: images, clinical tests, theatre cases,
blood units, physiotherapy treatments and pathology
tests were also calculated. The hospital’s health informa-
tion system database (computerised) was the main
source of these data although in some cases supplemen-
tary data were collected from individual service units.
In the process of allocating costs to the special clinic,
we encountered a number of difficulties. All the human
resources costs borne by the clinic are accounted for in
the clinic’s books and paid directly to the MCH person-
nel as extra salary. Some special clinic costs like water
and electricity bills are paid by the MCH and reported
in the main hospital accounting books only. The clinic
also purchases other specific goods and services (e.g.
blood bags) from the hospital and these are paid
directly to the hospital department/unit and reported in
both the clinic and department books. Renting of MCH
facilities and equipment and occasional drug supplies
from the hospital to the clinic are not reported or
accounted for.
M a n yM C Hr e g u l a rs t a f fw o r ke x t r ah o u r sa n dp r o -
vide occasional services for the clinic. Although such
costs are accounted for by the clinic, these are never
discounted by the MCH side, whether they took place
outside the hospital regular shift hours or not. Within
the clinic very few workers are assigned exclusively to a
specific department, and personnel costs had to be
apportioned according to inpatient equivalents.
The effect of these limitations in our ability to track
resource flows through the hospital is that costs of the
special clinic measured exclude a number of allocations
of shares of costs incurred by MCH. To the extent that
these do not imply increased resource use in MCH, they
imply a measure of cost close to average incremental
cost. In other respects, where MCH costs are directly
impacted by the special clinic, they understate the aver-
age incremental cost.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 show selected unit costs by inpatient ser-
vice unit for MCH and all unit costs by service unit for
the special clinic respectively. The selected costs for
MCH represent the range of costs and the different
departments of the hospital.
The differences between both types of unit costs in
the two tables were marked and significant (p < 0.05 for
admission; p < 0.001 for patient day). Such a crude
comparison ignores case mix differences, which are very
difficult to control for. Given the smaller number of ser-
vice units, the special clinics service units catered for a
heterogeneous mix of patients. Except in Clinic Sur
(Emergency and Resuscitation) where patients tend to
stay for a shorter period and are rapidly transferred,
costs per admission were higher than even the most
expensive specialist service units in MCH: neurology
and general surgery. Even Clinic Sur costs per admission
were higher than all but 3 specialist service units in
MCH. (Costs per admission for Oncology in MCH, not
included in Table 3, were 11,141,000 meticais.) Cost per
patient day is everywhere in the special clinics at least
Table 3 Selected unit costs by inpatient service unit,
MCH (’000 meticais, FY2001)
Department Service Unit Cost per
admission
Cost per patient
day
Department of Medicine
General medicine ward 1 2,204 362
General medicine ward 3 1,348 240
Neurology 17,459 396
Department of Surgery
General surgery 15,889 1,414
General abdominal 2,264 534
Urology 4,478 498
Department of paediatrics
Short duration 275 413
Neonatal care 1,231 228
Malnutrition 2,414 205
Department of
orthopaedics
Male orthopaedics 1 6,603 280
Female orthopaedics 5,482 290
Paediatrics 3,017 316
Obstetrics and
Gynaecology
General obstetrics 915 681
Gynaecology 2,301 285
(M’000, FY2001)
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of MCH.
A similar comparison is made between outpatient
costs in Table 5.
The special clinic cost per outpatient visit was over
13-fold the cost for the highest cost service unit of
MCH. That costs were significantly higher was expected
given the expected difference in amenity levels between
the two services. However, differences were greater,
especially in the outpatient and patient day comparisons
than easily explained by amenity alone, or by potential
case mix differences.
There was also a marked difference in the share of
capital and recurrent costs in the total between MCH
and the special clinic. The total cost for the Special
Clinic was 50bn meticais of which 98% was recurrent
expenditure and 2% capital. In contrast, MCH had a
more typical capital and recurrent cost balance. Of a
total of M232bn, 85% was recurrent and 15% capital.
The low level of capitalisation of the special clinics
reflects its policy of outsourcing (largely from MCH)
capital intensive services such as diagnostics and theatre,
and is suggestive of the extent to which we have under-
estimated the special clinic’s use of these.
Table 6 compares the breakdown of recurrent costs
between MCH and the special clinic.
While a similar share of recurrent costs is accounted
for by medical supplies, goods and services, the special
clinic uses 73% of its recurrent resources for staff costs,
and only 4% for drugs whereas MCH spends approxi-
mately equally on the two items. One explanation of
this difference is the much higher expenditure on per-
sonnel in absolute terms in the special clinic. 61% of
staff costs were physician costs. Physicians are mostly
employed by the special clinic on a contract basis, and
mostly paid on a per-visit or per-patient basis. Most of
these physicians are full time employees of MCH but
earn much more per hour on contract to the special
clinic than through their MCH salaries. Despite the
h u g ed i f f e r e n c ei nt h ep r o p o r t i o n a t ee x p e n d i t u r eo n
drugs, special clinic patients still receive on average a
higher value of drugs per inpatient day equivalent
(M106,000) than MCH patients (M87,000). However
these amounts are so small that it seems likely that spe-
cial clinic patients’ consumption has been under-esti-
mated for reasons discussed above. Widespread
unavailability and under provision of drugs in MCH is
well known but is not a concern in the special clinic.
Table 7 shows costs of the extent of use of MCH ser-
vices that we were able to trace. The total is small and
amounts to approximately 2% of total special clinic
expenditure. The special clinic makes a direct contribu-
tion to the income of MCH which amounts to M3.6bn,
or 7% of total special clinic expenditure. In addition to
this, certain ex-gratia payments are made to heads of
sections and heads of nursing services, although these
amount only to about M750 m (about 1.5% of total spe-
cial clinic expenditure).
Table 5 Cost per outpatient visit: MCH
Service unit Cost per outpatient visit
Medical outpatients 48
Surgical outpatients 92
Paediatric outpatients 56
Orthopaedic outpatients 84
Obstetrics and gynaecology outpatients 95
Special clinic 1,302
Currency: M’000, FY2001.
Table 4 Special clinic: unit costs by inpatient service unit
(M’000, cost excluding drugs and capital in parentheses)
Service Unit Cost per admission Cost per patient day
Clinic Sur 9,771 (9,318) 5,235 (4,992)
Clinic I 25,054 (23,650) 4,956 (4,678)
Clinic II 18,684 (17,450) 5,032 (4,705)
Clinic III 39,029 (35,593) 5,020 (4,707)
Currency: M’000, FY2001.
Table 6 Recurrent costs by category, MCH and special
clinic (million meticais)
Recurrent cost
category
MCH total cost (%
share)
Special clinic total cost
(% share)
Personnel 65,130 (33) 35,953 (73)
Drugs 69,479 (35) 1,910 (4)
Medical supplies 23,756 (12) 2,260 (5)
Goods 29,808 (15) 4,984 (10)
Services 9,020 (5) 3,989 (8)
TOTAL 197,193 (100) 49,095 (100)
Table 7 Special clinic non-salary recurrent costs borne by
MCH
Recurrent cost category Cost (M’000)
Water and electricity 93,314
Maintenance of infrastructure 47,554
Imaging 164,600
Physiotherapy 16,514
Morgue 1,270
Theatre 418.233
Laboratory 98.027
Pathology 39,036
Blood 54,084
TOTAL 932,633
Currency: M’000, FY2001.
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ging 520,000 MT (25USD) for an outpatient visit and
4,000,000 MT (200USD) for day spent in hospital, while
the main hospital was either free for patients referred
from other institutions or charging a “congestion fee” of
50,000 MT (2.3USD) per patient. The implication of this
was that the clinic’s marginal revenues were set below
the average incremental costs shown above, which are
themselves likely underestimates.
Discussion
Despite the care that was taken to measure costs
throughout the hospital and the special clinic, it seems
that hospital records do not allow for the full identifica-
tion of the use of MCH resources by the special clinic.
A comparison of average incremental cost with marginal
revenue indicates that the special clinic is cross-subsi-
dised by MCH.
Furthermore, the estimates provided are almost cer-
tainly underestimates of the average incremental cost. A
2% rate of capitalisation is not viable for the well-func-
tioning service that the special clinic appears to be.
Although out-sourcing is a potential explanation and
means of translating capital into recurrent cost, tracing
costs through the major supplier of out-sourced services
MCH, should translate those back to capital costs if the
use of MCH made by the special clinic had been fully
captured. Case-mix and focus on human resources-
intensive activities like outpatient visits could help
explain the relatively small share of the clinic’s capital
costs.
One review of hospital costing studies in developing
countries suggests capitalisation levels (capital cost as a
share of total cost) ranging from 17.8 to 43.8% where
capital costs were thought to have been fully accounted
for [
15]. A study of 6 hospitals in Malawi measured capi-
talisation levels between 47 and 57% though used a dif-
ferent methodology from that used here, and may have
overestimated the rate [16]. A study by one of the pre-
sent authors in Zimbabwe, using an identical methodol-
o g yt ot h a tu s e dh e r ea n df o u n dc a p i t a l i s a t i o nr a t e s
between 36 and 59% across 6 hospitals [17]. The capita-
lisation rate can vary widely across studies according to
method of cost accounting and in cases of severe under-
investment over a long period can drop well below the
rates cited above. For example, a study of Niamey
national hospital in Niger found a rate as low as 5% in a
context where ‘relatively little capital equipment...is
operational’ [18]. Nevertheless, this is quite unlike the
situation of the special clinic and we consider the 18%
figure, the lowest of those compared across a range of
settings where the methodology was judged sufficiently
sound, the lower bound of a realistic capitalisation rate
here. On that basis, there is approximately a shortfall of
at least M8bn in the capital resource use of the special
clinic that we have been able to account for. This signif-
icantly exceeds the full extent of the transfer payment
from the special clinic to MCH. That payment would
allow for a capitalisation rate of only 10.5%.
We also suspect that the special clinic’s use of MCH’s
pharmaceutical stocks has been underestimated. The
costing studies cited above can also be used to compare
the expenditure on drugs as a share of recurrent costs,
none reaching anything like as small a share as the 4.1%
measured for the special clinic. The range for medical
supplies as a whole across developing country settings
was 10.3 to 32% [13], and for the six Malawian hospi-
tals, 24.3 to 37.4% [14]. However, there are other possi-
bilities than that any deficit in our drug use estimates
have been at the expense of the MCH pharmacy. It is
possible that we have failed to trace the special clinic’s
own expenditures on drugs, or that special clinic
patients commonly take prescriptions to private phar-
macies rather than receive and be billed for drugs in the
clinic itself.
We face considerable difficulty in deciding how to
treat the large expenditure on physician salaries. The
above analysis treats these as cost. In principle, we seek
to measure the opportunity cost of the resources used.
Where these resources are traded in a competitive mar-
ket, it is reasonable to treat price as equivalent to
opportunity cost. However, the market for physician
labour is distorted. Since most doctors work for the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry is close to being a
monopsonist purchaser of physician labour and exerts
undue influence on the going salary rate. This produces
a downward pressure on salaries and implies that MCH
salaries understate the opportunity cost of physician
labour. In the special clinic, effective salary rates are
much higher, whereas economic theory would predict
that a slightly higher salary than the public sector rate
would attract ample supply of labour. There are at least
three possible explanations of this:
1. While doctors have no alternative employment
opportunities to public sector jobs, agency problems
in the health sector imply that their commitment to
those jobs and effort levels may be low without loss
of salary. In order to purchase commitment and
e f f o r tt h a tm a yb er e q u i r e db yh i g h e rm o n i t o r i n g
capacity in the special clinic, higher levels of salary
may be required. This implies that the salary levels
observed indeed reflect opportunity cost and sug-
gests no adjustments to our estimates are necessary.
2. Doctors in MCH may be the effective principals of
the special clinic. Hospitals may be viewed as ‘physi-
cian’s co-operatives’ [19] or more generally doctors
may be their dominant decision makers [20]. This
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function only by permission of doctors, and may buy
this consent through the payment of high salary
levels there. In this case, the salary levels observed
are not opportunity costs but economic rents, or
transfer payments, which should not be considered
part of the costs of operation. This perspective has
significant implications for our estimates as 45% of
total special clinic costs are accounted for by pay-
ments to physicians. However, even if we assume
that the real opportunity cost of physicians is zero,
this downward adjustment is insufficient to bring
special clinics’ average incremental cost as low as
marginal revenues for outpatient visits. In other
words, the price charged for outpatient visits does
not cover the non-physician staff time and other
inputs. Inpatient charges would cover non-physician
costs and approximately 55% of physician costs
which is more than the public sector salary (which
we assume below opportunity cost) and less than the
special clinic salary which may contain an element of
economic rent.
3. Current salary levels in MCH may be below the
reservation wage, or the minimum required to
secure the services of doctors in the labour market.
By subsidising those wages through payments for
work in the special clinic, doctors work for MCH as
a whole may be secured. On this argument, the
amounts paid to doctors might be considered a sub-
sidy to MCH, which could be added to the transfer
payments already identified. We cannot be more
p r e c i s ea b o u tt h ee x t e n to ft h i sp o t e n t i a ls u b s i d y
without further knowledge of the reservation wage.
Similar arguments can be made in relation to the
transfer payments paid to MCH including the ex-gratia
payments made to certain heads of MCH departments.
These can be considered payment to cover the special
clinic’s use of MCH resources including administration
by these individuals, or they may be considered rents
that do not reflect resource flows from MCH to the spe-
cial clinic. In principle, they should be included in or
excluded from special clinic cost accordingly.
Conclusion
Cost differences between MCH and the special clinic are
large, particularly when outpatient and costs per patient
day are compared. The differences are of an order of
magnitude that cannot be explained credibly by case
mix difference. By far the greatest contribution to the
cost difference is the physician salary component, if this
is indeed an opportunity cost and reflects the cost of
achieving commitment and effort from doctors. This
reflects both higher application of physician hours and a
higher rate of pay per hour. This in itself suggests that
cost differences do not reflect differences in amenity
levels alone.
The price charged for special clinic services does not
cover the cost of those services if the full expenditure
on physician salaries is considered part of that cost. For
outpatients, the price charged is insufficient to cover
even non-physician time and other inputs used. This
implies that MCH subsidises the special clinic, and that
the government subsidy provided to MCH leaks to the
support of the special clinic. If the physician salaries are
instead interpreted as economic rents, the special clinic
arrangement enables physicians to capture a share of
the subsidy provided by the government to the MCH,
presumably at the expense of patients there. Either way,
it would appear that the special clinic imposes costs on
users of MCH.
We were unable to capture fully the extent of special
clinic use of resources in MCH. Those captured totalled
approximately M1bn, only 2% of total special clinic
resource use. The extent to which this represents an
under-measurement of resource use is indicated by the
low resulting measured level of capitalisation of the spe-
cial clinic, also amounting to approximately 2%. A more
likely minimum level of capitalisation, equal to that of
MCH itself of 15% suggests a minimum resource flow
from MCH to the special clinic of M6.5bn (assuming
this resource flow was 100% capital) or M13bn (assum-
ing a 50-50 split). It is likely that we also under-esti-
mated special clinic patients’ use of the MCH pharmacy.
Despite the attempts to separate sites and manage-
ment, there is still considerable difficulty in accounting
for the flow of resources between the main hospital and
the clinic, especially of human resources and capital
goods. There is a need to develop accounting systems
that ensure greater transparency in order to establish
that arrangements in the special clinic make the net
contribution to public sector services for the majority
they often claim to make. In the absence of such a
transparent system demonstrating an equity promoting
cross-subsidy, it is unsurprising that popular disapproval
threatens the continuing operation of these
arrangements.
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